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CLOSING THE DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT GAP
By: David Leach

I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE ISSUE TO BE DISCUSSED
Divided infringement, also known as joint infringement, “is where a single act of patent
direct infringement occurs through the combined action of two (or more) separate parties.”1 The
patent infringement statutes under 35 U.S.C. § 271 do not address this type of infringement;
rather they impose liability only where a single entity performs each and every element of a
patented claim.2 When an act of divided infringement occurs, the performance of these claim
elements is divided between multiple actors in many instances to avoid liability. Several theories
addressing this gap in coverage have emerged from the courts.3 Eventually the Federal Circuit
took the reins and settled on a “direction or control” theory that finds a “mastermind” liable for
direct infringement in instances where the mastermind can be charged with the actions of
another.4 This standard has been narrowed to find divided infringement only in instances where
there is an agency relationship or some other contractual obligation.5 However, this standard is
too strict and leaves a large loophole for infringers to tacitly collude or enter into arm’s-length
agreements to avoid liability.

1

RealSource, Inc. v. Best Buy Co., 514 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957-58 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton David Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
3 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 367 F. Supp. 207, 253 (D. Conn. 1973)
(expanding the agency doctrine); On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d
1331, 1233-45 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (defining “participation” and a “combination of actions”).
4 See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007); MuniAuction, Inc. v.
Thompson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1585 (2009).
5 See Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311 (2010).
2
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B. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
This article explores the source of the statutory gap, the characteristics of direct and
indirect infringement, and then proposes two separate rules based on these characteristics to
close the gap. Part II examines the creation of the statutory gap fashioned by the intersection of
direct and indirect infringement under 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a)-(c). This gap is formed primarily by
the all-elements rule, which requires a unitary actor to perform every element of a claim.
Without satisfaction of this rule, there can be no direct or indirect infringement. This leads to a
gap in the statutory framework, which allows actors to divide the performance of the claims to
avoid liability.
In order to find a solution to the gap, a rule or rules should be developed to coincide with
the underlying characteristics of the current infringement statute of 35 U.S.C. § 271. Part III
examines the strict liability nature of direct infringement and the intent requirements under the
indirect infringement provisions. Direct infringement is a strict liability provision because
conduct that amounts to direct infringement hurts the patent owner regardless of the infringer’s
intent. Restricting this conduct entirely by imposing strict liability maximizes the incentive to
create while keeping the costs to society low. This contrasts with the indirect infringement
provisions, which require a showing of intent. The requirement of culpable intent is meant to
filter legitimate conduct from culpable conduct because the potential social costs of imposing
strict liability in regards to this type of conduct are large. A solution to the statutory gap should
therefore keep these principles of strict liability and intent in mind so as to both maximize the
incentive to create, while simultaneously allowing authorized or public domain activities to
continue to operate unhindered.

2

David Leach

Final Draft

The courts have developed several theories to address the statutory gap, however, the
current standard is too narrow. Part IV provides an overview of the development of separate
theories of liability meant to address the statutory gap. It begins in the pre-Federal Circuit era
with the development of an agency standard and a “some connection” theory. The Federal
Circuit then addresses the issue for the first time in dictum by suggesting a “participation and
combined action” theory. However, the Federal Circuit subsequently found this suggestion to be
too broad and settled on a “direction or control” standard, which has more recently been
narrowly limited to an agency relationship or other contractual obligation. The current standard
only addresses one of two possible divided infringement scenarios. Further, it fails to adequately
address the scenario it is meant to solve.
In order to address the statutory gap while continuing to maintain the delicate balance of
the infringement statutes, two separate rules should be enacted. Part V begins by suggesting that
the “direction or control” foundation should be replaced with a broader instrumentalities
approach. This approach would find an actor liable for using another as an instrumentality to
complete the elements of a claim regardless of direction of control. This would capture the
common scenario where an actor uses its relationship with customers to have the customer
perform the remaining elements of a claim.
Part V will further show that the court’s belief that unitary claim drafting can solve
divided infringement by way of arm’s-length agreement is improper. A rule based on the tort of
civil conspiracy should be enacted to close the remaining portion of the statutory gap. Both of
the rules proposed will have a mens rea requirement in order to address concerns of the court and
coincide with the underlying fundamentals of 35 U.S.C. § 271.

3

David Leach

Final Draft

II. STATUTORY GAP
The intersection of direct and indirect infringement under 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a)-(c)
demonstrates a statutory gap whereby an actor or a series of actors can avoid liability while
simultaneously interfering with a patent owner’s exclusive right. The primary culprit for this
statutory loophole is the all-elements rule, sometimes called the all-limitations rule, which
requires, in order to assign liability, that a single entity had performed each and every element of
a patented claim.6 This rule derives primarily out of the language of the direct infringement
statute, but is also a requirement under the indirect infringement schemes, which is how the
statutory gap is formed.
It is best to understand how this rule is required to satisfy direct infringement under 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) and indirect infringement under 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b) and (c) from a broad
perspective before exploring the details of the all-elements rule. Courts have consistently held
that direct infringement requires “a showing that a defendant has practiced each and every
element of the claimed invention.”7 This rule has its origins in the patent statute itself.8 Thus,
the all-elements rule is indispensable to proving a case for direct infringement.
Indirect infringement comprises two separate theories of liability, both of which require
proof of direct infringement by a third party with the implication that the all-elements rule is also
a requirement. The first theory of indirect infringement is induced infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(b). In order to prove inducement a plaintiff is required to show that a third party directly

6

See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton David Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See also WarnerJenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton David Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (setting forth the
element-by-element analysis for doctrine of equivalents); Builders Concrete, Inc. v. Bremerton
Concrete Prod. Co., 757 F.2d 255, 257 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Literal infringement requires that the
accused device embody every element of the claim.”).
8 See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 29.
7
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infringed the patented invention, that the defendants committed an act which induced this
infringement, and that the defendant had the affirmative intent to cause the direct infringement.9
Thus, for a patent holder to show that the defendant induced infringement, the patent holder must
prove the defendant’s activity caused the acts that constitute the infringement.10 Some such
activities include instructing how to engage in an infringing use and providing a design for the
infringing product.11 However, these activities do not in and of themselves create liability
without defendant performing these actions with a culpable state of mind and without the
existence of a direct infringement.
Similarly, to prove contributory infringement, the plaintiff must show there was direct
infringement by a third party; that the defendant sold or imported a component of a patented
machine or apparatus for use in a patented process; that the sold or imported item is not a staple
or commodity suitable for substantial non-infringing uses; and that the defendant knew the item
was made or adapted for use in such infringement.12 The activities that give rise to contributory
liability are narrower than that of inducement. However, just as with induced infringement, the
activities must be accompanied by a direct infringement and the defendant must have had a
culpable state of mind.
The requirement of direct infringement by a third party derived from the common law to
deal with blameworthy activities that fell outside of the direct infringement scheme.13 Prior to
the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271, the courts had developed a common law definition of
contributory infringement barrowed from the law of joint tortfeasors, which imposes liability on
Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
11 Metabolite Labs, Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Water Tech. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
12 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2011).
13 See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
9

10
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“one who intentionally caused, or aided and abetted, the commission of a tort by another.”14
“The most common pre-1952 contributory infringement cases dealt with the situation where a
seller would sell a component which was not itself technically covered by the claims of a product
or process patent but which had no other use except with the claimed product or process.”15
When the 1952 Patent Act was enacted, it sought to capture this common conduct under 35
U.S.C. § 271(c) and prohibited all other types of culpable activity under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) that
existed at the time.16 Implicit in this common law joint tort was a requirement for there to have
been direct infringement by a third party because one cannot aid or abet the commission of a tort
by another without the commission of a tort by another. In patent law the tort is direct
infringement. Hence, the necessity for there to have been a direct infringement by a third party
under the indirect infringement provisions.
The all-elements rule has two components, which are both material to contributing to the
statutory gap. Direct infringement occurs when “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers
to sell, or sells any patented invention within the United States or imports into the United States
any patented invention during the term of the patent.”17 The courts have interpreted 35 U.S.C. §
271(a) as having an implicit all-elements rule.18 This rule has two components, the first of which
will be called hereinafter the “entire claim component.” The second component will be called
hereinafter the “unitary actor component.”

See Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir. 1897); Tubular
Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200, 202 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898).
15 Hewlett-Packard Co., 909 F.2d at 1469.
16 Hewlett-Packard Co., 909 F.2d at 1469.
17 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2011).
18 See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton David Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
14
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The “entire claim component” is material because it limits the conduct required for
finding direct infringement. This component requires a showing that each and every element or
step of a claim for the patented invention had been made, used, sold, offered to be sold, or
imported; in other words, that all the elements of the claim had been performed.19 This “entire
claim component” derives directly from the language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The idea is that in
order for certain acts to be considered infringing, the object of those actions must be a “patented
invention.”20 However, a patented invention is defined by its claims.21 Therefore, if all of the
elements or steps of a claim are not performed, then something other than the “patented
invention” has been implemented, and consequently there is no infringement. Thus, infringing
conduct is limited to the entirety of a particular claim.
The “unitary actor component” also materially contributes to the statutory gap because it
limits the performer of infringing conduct to a single entity. This component says that not only
does every element or step of a particular claim have to be performed; it also requires that a
single entity, and only a single entity, must have been the actor performing every element or
step.22 Thus, where one actor performs less than all of the elements of a claim and another actor
performs the remaining elements, there is no direct infringement even though the entirety of the
invention has been practiced. This is the statutory gap.
The source of the “unitary actor component” is less clear than that of the “entire claim
component,” particularly because the word “whoever” within 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) can be
19

See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007); WarnerJenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton David Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
20 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2011).
21 See 35. U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2011); Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 29 (1997).
22 See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007); WarnerJenkinson Co., Inc., 520 U.S. at 29.
7
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interpreted in the singular or plural. When the courts reference the rationales underlying the allelements rule, they typically treat the “unitary actor component” as a foregone conclusion and
focus more on the “entire claim component.”23 Although, the courts do not address the rationale
behind this component directly, the Federal Circuit in BMC Resources addressed it indirectly.
The BMC Resources court refused to expand direct infringement liability to reach the
independent conduct of multiple actors for fear that it would “subvert the statutory scheme,” thus
implying direct infringement requires the acts of one actor.24 The idea is that such expansion
would find those who practice less than all of the elements of a claim strictly liable, thereby
punishing those who may be practicing elements that are authorized or in the public domain.25
Further, the court had concerns that such strict liability would render the statutory provisions of
indirect infringement under 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b) and (c) superfluous precisely because it would
eliminate the need to prove intent for the independent conduct of multiple actors.26 Thus, the
source of the “unitary actor” requirement comes out of viewing direct infringement and indirect
infringement together.
The requirement that a unitary actor had to have performed every element of a claim
creates the statutory gap, which is manifest in two discrete loopholes in which an entity or
entities can capture the value of the invention from the patent owner without being held liable.27
The first loophole, which will be called hereinafter the “mastermind loophole,” occurs where a
single entity performs less than all of the elements of a claim and then uses another entity to

23

See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 29.
See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
25 See BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1380; Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 520 U.S. at. 29
26 See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d at 1380; Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S.
at 29.
27 See BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381.
24
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perform the remaining steps of the claim.28 The second loophole, which will be called
hereinafter the “conspiratory loophole,” occurs in circumstances where multiple parties enter into
an arm’s-length agreement to avoid infringement by dividing the performance of the claim.29 An
arm’s length agreement is one “between two parties who are not related or not on close terms
and who are presumed to have roughly equal bargaining power.”30 This particular situation
differs from the “mastermind situation” in that there is no mastermind, no controlling party.
These loopholes should be closed. Whenever someone other than the patent owner
performs a patented invention, the patent owner is harmed. This is true regardless of whether
one actor or multiple actors combined performs every element or step of a patented claim. When
profits are realized from the performance of a patented invention, those are profits that likely
would have gone to the patent owner. Further, the patent owner may be forced into price
competition, which would undermine the purpose of the patent.
The problem of divided infringement has amplified as computer and telecommunications
technology has increased because such technology many times comes in the form of methods or
systems. Apparatus and article claims do not carry as much risk of divided infringement as
system and method claims.31 In order to capture the value of a physical object, that physical
object typically needs to be sold, which will normally result in at least one direct infringer.
“Physical objects typically accumulate the contributions of multiple actors, so in many situations,
some act of making, using, selling, or importing will eventually correspond to the claimed
apparatus, even if based originally on contributions from multiple parties.”32 While it is possible

28

Id.
Id.
30 Black’s Law Dictionary 44 (3rd Pocket ed. 2006).
31 See Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 275 (2005).
32 Id.
29
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to draft apparatus claims that create divided infringement issues, the risk is much less than for
inventions that can only be described as systems or methods.33 Patent owners should not have to
face such risk purely because they happen to own an invention that is particularly susceptible to
divided infringement activities. Therefore, a rule or series of rules should be developed to
mitigate this risk by closing the loopholes, while at the same time addressing potential social
costs associated with such increase in protection.
III. STRICT LIABILITY AND MENS REA AS GUIDES TO A SOLUTION
Intellectual property law generally attempts to balance the incentive to create with the
social costs that result from such enticement. The incentive comes from an exclusive right that
may result in recoupment of costs and substantial profits for the patent owner that likely would
not have been realized without this exclusive right. The social costs consist predominantly of
reduced access to the creative work, increased consumer prices, and in some cases the restriction
of public domain activities that may be mistakenly construed to interfere with the exclusive right.
An increase in exclusive rights to intellectual property is justified only when the value of
increased creative activity resulting from increased incentives is greater than the value of the
benefits lost from reduced access. In patent law, this balance can be found in the strict liability
nature of direct infringement and the mens rea requirements of contributory and induced
infringement, which are both instructive in fashioning a remedy for divided infringement.
A patent owner’s exclusive right is harmed whenever the patented invention is no longer
exclusive. This is true regardless of whether the infringing activity occurred at the hand of one
actor or the combined action of multiple actors because it is the end result of their actions that is
of consequence. Further, this is true regardless of the infringing actors’ state of mind.
33

Id.
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“Logically, the patent owner's control over the invention has been harmed by the mere fact that
the accused activity occurred: the harm does not require the accused to [sic] actor to have acted
out of an intent to injure; nor is that harm mitigated if the accused acted innocently.”34 While
this harm is relatively constant, the social costs that are implicated in capturing culpable parties
vary depending on the nature of the activity that transpired. The patent statutes assigning
liability for direct and indirect infringement take these social costs into account, which is why the
law does not provide blanket liability for every act that potentially interferes with the exclusivity
of a patented invention.
Direct infringement is a strict liability offense meaning that the plaintiff is not required to
prove the defendant had a culpable state of mind.35 “Infringement may be entirely inadvertent
and unintentional and without knowledge of the actual patent.”36 Thus, “the unauthorized
making, using, and selling of the invention reduces the private value of the invention to its
owner, whether that value is captured by others deliberately, knowingly, negligently, or
mistakenly.”37 Therefore, a single entity that performs every element of a patented claim is
strictly liable for the harm to the patent owner’s exclusive right that results from this sort of
activity, most likely because such actions have no purpose other than to capture the value of a
patented invention. Such a strong level of protection is justified because the value of the creative
activity that results is greater than the value of benefits lost by totally restricting the actions that
constitute direct infringement.

Carl Moy, 4 Moy's Walker on Patents § 14:14 (4th ed.).
See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
36 Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968).
37 John W. Schlicher, 2 Patent Law, Legal and Economic Principles § 8:19 (2d ed.).
34
35

11

David Leach

Final Draft

This is not the case for the activities defined under the indirect infringement provisions of
35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b) and (c). In this context a party is liable for activities that aid or abet the
direct infringement of another. Whenever these actions do actually assist in an infringement, the
patent owner is harmed. However, unlike the actions that constitute direct infringement, the
activities of indirect infringement may have legitimate results where the value of those activities
does not depend on the ultimate implementation of a patented invention.38 “If imposing strict
liability has the potential for prohibiting conduct whose value is not derived from use of the
invention, the law may seek to avoid that result by imposing liability only where a person knew
the value of his conduct depended on use of the patent.”39
Therefore, the indirect infringement scheme provides an intent requirement that is used
as a screen to distinguish actors attempting to capture part of the value of the invention from
those who are providing authorized or public domain goods or services.40 Providing this screen
shows recognition by the statute that assigning liability to conduct that does not constitute the
making, selling, offering to sell, or importing of a patented invention may result in an overly
broad exclusive right that reduces socially beneficial conduct, which violates the net benefits
principle. The practice of every element of a claim is nothing less than the practice of the
invention, but conduct constituting less than all of the elements can have legitimate purpose
other than the capturing of the patent’s value. Therefore, something more must be shown to
provide assurance that such legitimate conduct is not captured. That additional showing is the
culpable intent required of contributory and induced infringement. Therefore, where conduct
may derive value independent of the patented invention, a patent owner should be required to

John W. Schlicher, 2 Patent Law, Legal and Economic Principles § 8:22 (2d ed.).
Id.
40 See Id.
38
39
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prove the actor acted with the purpose or with the knowledge that its actions would attach value
from the patented invention.
IV. COURT DEVELOPED SOLUTIONS TO CLOSING THE STATUTORY GAP
Prior to the Federal Circuit’s decision in BMC Resources setting out the current standard,
two separate theories of liability for divided infringement had been developed primarily by the
district courts and United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. A third theory had also
been suggested in dictum by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
The first theory that arose out of the Ninth Circuit prior to the 1952 Patent Act was based
on agency law. This theory says “one may infringe a patent if he employ[s] an agent for that
purpose or [has] the offending articles manufactured for him by an independent contractor.”41 In
one instance the court was persuaded to broaden this agency principle to a situation where the
defendant performed all of the steps except for a heating step, which was intended to be
completed by the customer.42 In this situation the court held that while there was no actual
agency relationship because there was no manifestation of intent that the agent act on behalf of
the principal, the “defendant, in effect, made each of its customers its agent in completing the
infringement step, knowing full well that the infringement step would in fact be promptly and
fully completed by those customers.”43 The court’s rationale for this expansion was that the
defendant’s activities constituted the substance of the claims and that these activities combined
with the knowledge that the customer would conduct the remaining step was substantially
equivalent to the performance of the entire claim of the patented invention.44

41

Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, 143 F.2d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir. 1944).
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 367 F. Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 1973).
43 Id at 253.
44 See Id. at 253.
42
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After the development of the agency theory, the “some connection” theory emerged from
the district courts. Under the “some connection” theory a defendant may be liable for direct
infringement by performing less than all of the elements of a claim when the elements are wholly
performed by combined action and the defendant had sufficient connection to, or control over,
the entities performing the remaining elements.45 This view established a lower threshold for
finding direct infringement of a divided claim than what was established under the agency theory
because a showing of “agency” or “working in concert” was not necessarily required in order to
establish sufficient connection between the defendant and a third party, although such a showing
was sufficient.
The Federal Circuit ultimately addressed the issues raised by divided infringement,
recognized that liability may be found in this context, and suggested a very broad “participation
and combined action” theory to remedy the statutory gap.46 This broad theory suggested that
“when infringement results from the participation and combined action(s) of more than one
person or entity, they are all joint infringers and jointly liable for patent infringement.”47
However, the Federal Circuit held in a subsequent case that this standard was dictum, that it “did
not change [the] court’s precedent with regard to joint infringement.”48 The BMC Resources
court also noted that this standard would improperly expand direct infringement to capture the
45

See, e.g., Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Indus., Inc., No. 02C 2855, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7211, at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2003) (denying motion for summary judgment of noninfringement where two entities collectively performed a patented process); Shields v.
Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (W.D. La. 1980), aff’d, 667 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1982)
(finding defendants liable for infringement of a patent that claimed a method of preparing an
offshore oil rig based on the combined actions of two entities who assisted one another at the
same location to perform the method by adopting the “participation and combined action”
standard).
46 On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
47 Id. at 1344-45.
48 BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (2007).
14
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independent conduct of multiple actors, thereby subverting the mens rea requirement of indirect
infringement by means of this strict liability standard.49
The BMC Resources court then officially adopted a narrower standard of “direction or
control.”50 In doing so, it acknowledged that the “direction or control” standard only applies to
the “mastermind loophole” where a party simply contracts out the elements of a patented
invention to another entity.51 The standard was purposely constructed to be inapplicable to the
“conspiratory loophole” of arm’s-length agreements because the concerns of expanding direct
infringement to multiple actors outweigh the benefits of capturing this group of tortfeasors.52
The court also felt that not having a legal remedy for this situation was not a severe concern
because “a patentee can usually structure a claim to capture infringement by a single party.”53
Despite this conclusion, the court’s acknowledgement that the “conspiratory loophole” does not
have a remedy under the “direction or control” standard demonstrates the Federal Circuit’s view
that the arm’s length agreements to divide the performance of elements of a patented claim is an
improper avoidance of infringement that has the potential to harm the patent owner. The opinion
leaves open the possibility that where claim-drafting techniques are not sufficient, a rule that
addresses the concerns of subversion of the indirect infringement scheme may be implemented.
The Federal Circuit in BMC Resources did not provide much instruction as to the type of
relationship that would satisfy “direction or control.” All that was provided was a
pronouncement that direction or control of other parties by a “mastermind” party is required and
See Id. at 1381 (2007).
BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (2007).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 BMC Resources, Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381 (citing Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement
Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 272-75 (2005)).
49
50
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a suggestion that the doctrine of vicarious liability is a theory dealing with masterminds.54
Naturally the Federal Circuit took up another case to provide more clarity.55 The court in
Muniauction, solidified the “direction or control” standard and officially adopted a theory of
vicariousness by stating that the “direction or control” standard is fulfilled “where the law would
traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by another
party that are required to complete the performance of a claimed method.”56 This holding quietly
adopted the agency theory proposed much earlier by the Ninth Circuit, and precluded the
expansive agency theory and the “some connection” theory.
A few years later, the Federal Circuit expressly adopted the agency theory in its attempt
to add to the incomplete instructions of Muniauction.57 The Akamai court also adopted a
contractual obligation theory as another way to satisfy the “direction or control” foundation by
stating, “a joint infringement occurs when a party is contractually obligated to the accused
infringer to perform a method step.”58 Thus, “direction or control” is satisfied when there is an
agency relationship or other contractual obligation between the parties who perform all of the
elements of a claim.59
As of the writing of this article, the Federal Circuit has vacated this judgment and is in
the process of issuing an en banc decision on the issue: “if separate entities each perform
separate steps of a method claim, under what circumstances would that claim be directly

54

BMC Resources, Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381.
See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (2008).
56 Id.
57 See Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311, 1319 (2010).
58 Id.
59 See Id. at 1320.
55
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infringed and to what extent would each of the parties be liable?”60 The remainder of this article
provides insight into answering this question.
V. SOLUTIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The courts have shown a trend of strengthening patent owners’ rights from the common
law doctrine of contributory liability to the creation of the doctrine of equivalents and the
broadening of the obviousness standard.61 The courts should follow this trend by strengthening
patent owners’ rights against divided infringers. The current standard of “direction and control”
dealing with the “mastermind loophole” is too narrow. Only an agency relationship or other
contractual obligation can satisfy this standard, which reduces the flexibility of the courts to
expand liability to conduct that captures the patent’s value that falls outside of these rigid
definitions. Further, the Federal Circuit has mistakenly relied on claim drafting techniques to
protect patent owners against those that would exploit the statutory gap by entering into arm’slength agreements. While claim-drafting techniques are a strong tool for the patent practitioner,
the court should not mandate the use of these techniques, but rather should leave it to the
practitioner’s discretion. Finally a rule based on the tort of civil conspiracy should be adopted to
fill the “conspiratorial loophole.”
B. CLOSING THE “MASTERMIND LOOPHOLE”
In closing the “mastermind loophole” the courts should abandon the “direction or
control” foundation for a broader, more flexible instrumentality standard. Currently a

Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. MIT, 419 F. App’x 989 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton David Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997); KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
60
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mastermind is liable only where the mastermind has “direction or control” over another party
such that the other party’s actions would be legally considered the actions of the mastermind.
Under an instrumentality approach, a mastermind would be considered liable where the
mastermind uses another party as an instrumentality to complete a patented invention. While
direction or control of the other party would be sufficient, it would not be necessary. A
mastermind could fabricate a situation where it performs most of the elements of a patented
claim and leave the remaining elements to be performed by another, knowing with near certainty
that the other party will complete those elements. This situation would be devoid of direction or
control as it is currently defined. However, the patented invention would be completed causing
harm to the patent owner.
One of the more common and specific scenarios lacking direction or control is where a
mastermind utilizes its relationship with customers to have the customers complete the final
elements of a claim after the mastermind had completed the most essential elements.62 In Mobil
Oil Corp., the defendant had essentially used the plaintiff’s patent to build catalysts utilized in
the oil to gas cracking process. However, in the process for making the catalysts, the defendant
failed to perform the final step, which required the application of heat. The defendant knew at
the time it sold each of its accused catalysts that its customers would place the them into their
catalytic cracking units, that in doing so they would be subjected to the heating conditions
specified in the patent, and that consequently all of the effects of heating would be achieved by
the customer, thereby completing the patented invention.63

62

See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 367 F. Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 1973); Centillion
Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Comm'cns Int'l, 631 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
63 Mobil Oil Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 253.
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A more recent case decided by the Federal Circuit under the current “control or direction”
standard demonstrates the flaccidity of this approach. In Centillion, the patent at issue was
directed to a system for collecting, processing and delivering billing information so that the
customer can further process, display, and analyze the data on a personal computer. The system
comprised a back-end consisting of a storage means, a data processing means, a transferring
means, and a front-end consisting of a personal computer data processing means. The
defendants created and implemented the back-end. However, the defendants merely provided
software to the customer to be installed at their discretion to implement the personal computer
data processing means. The court held that the accused was not vicariously liable for the actions
of its customers because they "in no way direct its customers to perform nor do its customers act
as its agents."64 The court noted that while the accused provides software and technical
assistance, this is not use particularly because it is entirely the decision of the customer to install
and operate the software on the "personal computer data processing means."65 Finally, the court
held that the accused did not "make" the system under § 271(a) because it did not combine all of
the claim elements: "the customer, not the accused, completes the system by providing the
'personal computer data processing means' and installing the client software."66
Despite the court’s holding that the accused was not liable for direct infringement or
divided infringement, there is still harm to the patent owner’s exclusive right because the patent
owner’s system is no longer exclusive. Under this scenario it is reasonable to believe that the
accused could have utilized the back-end system to process billing data but deliver it in a fashion
that did not require the personal computer processing means. However, when the accused

64
65
66

Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Comm'cns Int'l, 631 F.3d 1279, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 1288
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provided the software that was compatible with the back-end system, it is also reasonable to
believe that the accused knew with relative certainty that the customer would complete the
patented system by installing and utilizing this software. Due to the possibility that the back-end
system could be used for legitimate non-infringing uses that would allow the accused to derive
value independent of the patented invention, there should be a rule that screens such legitimate
use from liability. Thus, under the instrumentality approach a rule with an intent requirement
can be developed that coincides with the principles of 35 U.S.C. § 271 to capture this sort of
conduct without being overbroad.
Under an instrumentality foundation, a rule similar to the broad agency theory seen in
Mobil Oil Corp. prior to BMC Resources could be adopted to capture these types of actions.
Such a test would require that the accused completed the essence of the claim; the customer
performed an element or series of elements completing the claim; and the alleged infringer knew
that the customer would perform the final elements or knew that the completion of the final
elements would be the natural result. The mens rea requirement of knowledge addresses the
possible social costs associated with extending liability to those who do not actually or
vicariously perform every element of a claim. This requirement also provides assurance that
only those with a culpable state of mind are liable and also delivers significant circumstantial
evidence that the elements performed by the accused are capturing the value of the patented
invention, rather than receiving value independent of the patent.
C. REBUTTING THE CLAIM DRAFTING SOLUTION
Claim drafting techniques may be utilized to mitigate the dangers associated with divided
infringement, however, these techniques should not be the only solution and should not be
imposed on practitioners by the courts. In BMC Resources, the court refused to fashion a
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solution to the “conspiratory loophole” partly because it considers this loophole not much of a
concern since a claim drafter can “usually structure a claim to capture infringement by a single
party.”67 This claim structure referenced in BMC Resources is called unitary claim form.68
Unitary claim form focuses on one entity and whether it supplies or receives any given
element.69 The idea is to write the claim from the perspective of one actor, so that even if other
actors perform the action of the claim element, it will be performed from the viewpoint of the
single actor. An example would be a method, which requires information to be generated at a
server, which is then transferred to a client. The client then performs an action based on the
information received from the server. The non-unitary claim would look something like this:

A method for communicating information comprising:
generating a signal encoding information at A;
transmitting the signal from A to B; and
performing an action at B in response to the signal.

Under this claim, no single entity can perform every step of the claim. Thus, the claim
must be written in unitary form, which can be done from two directions:

A method for communicating information comprising:
generating a signal encoding information at A; and
transmitting the signal from A to B, wherein B is adapted to perform an action in
response to the signal.

-or-

67

BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (2007) (citing Mark A.
Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 272-75 (2005).
68 See Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 272 (2005).
69 See Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 272 (2005)
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A method for communicating information comprising:
receiving a signal encoding information at B, the signal being produced at A; and
performing an action at B in response to the signal.

The first of these unitary claims is written from the perspective of A and the second is
from the perspective of B. If both A and B perform their roles, there will be direct infringement
according to these claims. While the solution is powerful and preferable, there are many
problems associated with this type of claim drafting. Some of these problems include the claims
being invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 as indefinite and the impossibility of drafting certain
types of claims. Further, the court provides weak basis for concluding unitary claim drafting is
the only solution.
Converting a claim to unitary claim form increases the risk that a claim will be held to
violate 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 for indefiniteness. One of the requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
¶ 2 is that the claims must particularly point out and distinctly define the metes and bounds of the
claimed subject matter.70 This is an objective requirement evaluated in the context of whether
the claim is definite—whether the scope of the claim is clear to a person having ordinary skill in
the art.71 A claim that is indefinite does not sufficiently delineate the legal boundaries of the
invention, thus such a claim would be invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. Functional language is
typically considered indefinite unless the language meets the precise standards of mean plus
function claiming under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 or is combined with sufficient structure as to
describe the invention’s outer boundaries. Functional language attempts to define something by
what it does, rather than what it is.72 In the examples above, the phrases “being produced at” and
“adapted to” is functional language, which did not exist prior to the conversion to the unitary
70

See MPEP 2173 (2010).
See Id.
72 See MPEP 2173.05(g) (2010).
71

22

David Leach

Final Draft

claim form. Consequently, utilizing unitary claim form increases the risk that the claim will
violate 35 U.S.C § 112, ¶ 2. Such risk should not be imposed on a patent owner by the court
simply because the patent owner has rights to an invention that is susceptible to divided
infringement conduct.
Another problem with unitary claim drafting is that it contemplates that every element
requires some interaction with the unitary actor. Unitary claim form focuses on one entity and
whether it supplies or receives any given element.73 Thus, where a system or a process is more
complex requiring multiple parties, there is an increased possibility that actions required by the
claim will be performed by actors far afield of the unitary actor, thus making it virtually
impossible to draft a claim from the perspective of that unitary actor. An example would be if
the sample claims shown above had an additional step of transmitting the output response of B to
another entity C. In this case it would be impossible to write the claims from the perspective of
A because C does not directly interact with A.
According to the BMC Resources court, “the concerns over a party avoiding infringement
by arm’s-length cooperation can usually be offset by proper claim drafting” because “a patentee
can usually structure a claim to capture infringement by a single party.”74 However, the
foundation that instructs the court’s conclusion is weak. The court relies on Mark Lemley’s
article, but this article is meant more as a guide to practitioners for dealing with the statutory gap
than an article arguing change in policy. The court relies primarily on his statements that “most
inventions that involve cooperation of multiple entities can be covered using claims drafted in
unitary form simply by focusing on one entity and whether it supplies or receives any given
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See Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 272 (2005).
BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (2007) (citing Mark A.
Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 272-75 (2005).
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element.”75 However, this statement is conclusory and does not provide any empirical data to
support this claim. Thus, the court’s reliance on this conclusion is unfounded.
Providing a remedy for divided infringement would provide an additional tool to the
patent practitioner to assure the client that at least some protection may be available. If only
unitary claim form is considered suitable for imposing liability on an infringer, then the patent
owner runs the risk that there would be no protection at all in the event that the claims fail due to
indefiniteness or that unitary claims are impossible to draft. On the other hand, if some
protection is allowed for divided claims by providing an intent limited rule, then a practitioner
can draft a divided claim and a series of unitary claims. In the event that the unitary claims fail
to capture a single actor, there would still be an opportunity for the divided claim to succeed
because it is more likely to avoid an indefinite rejection. Consequently, the courts should not
impose unitary claim drafting as the only solution to the “conspiratory situation” because it is
court imposed risk.
D. CLOSING THE “CONSPIRATORY LOOPHOLE”
The “direction or control” standard, which is satisfied by an agency relationship or other
contractual obligation, is an expansion of direct infringement through vicarious liability because
the acts of the agent are charged to the principal, thus the principal is considered to have
performed every element of the patented claim. Indirect infringement is a form of accomplice
liability whereby the tortfeasor is guilty for their assistance to the direct infringer. Thus, it stands
to reason that an agreement (express or implied) between two or more persons to commit an
unlawful act should be met with a form of conspiracy liability. Under the “conspiratory
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Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 272 (2005).
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loophole,” the unlawful act is the capturing of the value of an invention from the patent owner by
an agreement between two or more parties to divide the performance of a patented claim.
Just as the courts turned to tort law to fashion a solution to those that assisted in the
commission of a direct infringement, the courts should turn to tort law to devise a rule to close
the “conspiratory loophole.” The court in BMC Resources recognized the conspiratory loophole,
but dismissed addressing it out of fear of subverting the intent requirement of indirect
infringement by expanding the rules governing direct infringement to reach the independent
conduct of multiple actors.76 The court’s concern is certainly legitimate, however, it can be
addressed by a rule that closely follows the provisions of indirect infringement by requiring the
proof of a culpable state of mind. Thus, the tort of civil conspiracy should be utilized to address
those concerns while closing the “conspiratory loophole.”77
To establish a civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must prove: (1) an association of two or more
persons; (2) an unlawful objective; (3) an agreement, understanding, or “meeting of the minds”
regarding the objective and the means of pursuing it; (4) a commission of an unlawful act in
furtherance of the agreement; and (5) injury resulting from the conspiracy.78 The modified
patent law version of conspiratorial infringement would require (1) an association of two or more
parties; (2) the purpose or knowledge that combined action would result in the performance of
another’s patented invention; (3) an agreement, understanding, or “meeting of the minds”
regarding circumvention of the patent and the means of pursuing it; and (4) performance of all
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BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (2007).
See Long Truong, After Bmc Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.: Conspiratorial Infringement
As A Means of Holding Joint Infringers Liable, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1897, 1922 (2009).
78 See James Lockhart, Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy, 4 Causes of Action 2d 517 (2007).
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the elements of the claim by the parties through the agreement.79
The court in BMC Resources was concerned with expanding direct infringement beyond
the all-elements rule to capture conduct of actors that independently constitute less than all of the
claim elements. This is a substantial concern because more often than not individual claim
elements are in the public domain. It is usually the combination of the whole that makes the
invention novel. Therefore, imposing strict liability for this sort of conduct would have
significant social costs by limiting the public’s access to public domain technology. Such social
costs likely outweigh the benefits associated with an increase in protection.
However, the conspiratory loophole is limited in several ways to address the court’s
concerns and to find the appropriate balance between incentive and costs. The first limitation is
the requirement of purpose or knowledge. “For a civil conspiracy, the conspiring defendants
must have actual knowledge that a tort is planned and must concur in the tortious scheme with
knowledge of its unlawful purpose and an intent to aid in its commission.”80 This limitation
eliminates the possibility that an entity will inadvertently become a party to conspiratory
infringement.81 This is important because it eliminates the additional cost of an entity having to
scrutinize each relationship it becomes involved in for the possibility it may become liable
simply for conducting normal and legitimate business operations. It also ensures that there is a
meeting of the minds as to an unlawful purpose and once again provides circumstantial evidence
that the end result of the conspiracy is to attach the value of the patented invention to the conduct
sought to be restricted and that such intention will be realized.
79

See James L. Buchwalter & Lonnie E. Griffith, Jr., 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 18; Long Truong,
After Bmc Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.: Conspiratorial Infringement As A Means of
Holding Joint Infringers Liable, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1897, 1922 (2009).
80 James L. Buchwalter & Lonnie E. Griffith, Jr., 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 18.
81 See Id.
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Another limitation of conspiratory infringement goes slightly beyond that of civil
conspiracy. Under civil conspiracy it is possible to find a conspiracy to reach an illegal end
where the illegal end has not yet been achieved.82 “If the plaintiff can show not the completed
conspiracy but an overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy, liability may still attach if that overt
act has caused actual damage to the plaintiff.”83 Under the conspiratory infringement theory, the
conspiracy by definition must be complete because the damage to the patent owner only occurs
when the combined action under the agreement results in the performance of all of the claim
elements. Thus, the requirement that all of the elements of a claim must have been performed
ensures that only conduct related to the appropriating of the value of the patent is condemned.
An example of a scenario where the court could not find liability under the current
standard of direction or control, but could find liability under conspiratory infringement is that of
Golden Hour Data Sys. v. emsCharts, Inc.84 In Golden Hour Data Systems, the plaintiff had a
patent to an integrated emergency medical transportation database system. The system provides
for the integration of dispatch, clinical services, and billing data. The patent discloses a dispatch
module, a clinical module, an administrative module, and a billing module. The basic concept of
the invention is a comprehensive system that includes modules for dispatching emergency
medical teams, tracking their movement to and from the accident scene, managing a clinical
diagnosis and treatment, and accurately billing the patient for the services rendered. Prior to this
invention, no fully integrated medical systems had been developed.
The accused infringers were emsCharts (“D1”) and Softtech (“D2”). D1 produced a webbased medical charting program called emsCharts. The emsCharts program charts patient
82

Shook v. St. Bede Sch., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1181 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
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84 614 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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information and provides integrated billing. D2 produces computer-aided flight dispatch
software called Flight Vector, which coordinates flight information, such as patient pickup and
delivery, and flight tracking. The two companies formed a strategic partnership, enabled their
two programs to work together, and collaborated to sell the two programs as a unit.85 While the
combination of the systems constituted the plaintiff’s system, the court held that the evidence
presented was not sufficient to prove "direction" or "control" by D1 over D2 or vice versa.86
The evidence presented by the plaintiff as to “direction or control” was a non-exclusive
distributorship agreement; evidence in the record showing D1 had been paid directly by a
customer for D2’s software; a joint submission to bid for a contract; communications from D1
urging D2 to stay diligent in closing sales; joint sales information sessions; and joint price
quotes. None of these forms of evidence were legally sufficient because "making information
available to the other party, prompting the other party, instructing the other party, or facilitating
or arranging for the other party’s involvement in the alleged infringement is not sufficient to find
control or direction."87 Further, the agreement expressly stated that D1 had no rights to D2 other
than to promote its product.88 Thus, D2 was an independent contractor that was not under
sufficient “direction" or "control" to find D1 vicariously liable.89
Under the scenario presented by Golden Hour Data Systems each defendant could avoid
direct infringement liability by maintaining control over their own product when it is sold or
offered to be sold to the customer. Thus, there would be no single entity selling the entire
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infringing system to the customer. However, evidence suggests that the defendants created a
partnership with the purpose that the customer would combine the systems, and promoted such
combination. Thus, there appears to be joint sales that occurred, which ultimately consisted of
the patented invention. Of course this scenario demonstrates how the limiting principles of the
conspiratory rule are beneficial. Evidence of knowledge that this combined action would result
in the completion of plaintiff’s invention would prevent the imposition of liability on defendants
that merely sell systems that are in the public domain and just happen to be combined by the
customer.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ultimate goal of patent law is to incentivize creation of new and useful inventions
while simultaneously keeping the costs of such incentives smaller than the benefits of the
resulting creative activity. This balance is seen in the strict liability nature of the direct
infringement statutory scheme and the intent requirements of indirect infringement. These
characteristics instruct that where an actor’s conduct is capable of deriving value independent of
the patented invention, limitations should be imposed to ensure such authorized and public
domain activities are not restricted.
The courts have expressed concern and restraint on imposing liability for divided
infringement conduct particularly because they fear the incentive-cost balance will be disrupted.
However, such restraint has the cost of reduced incentive for inventions that are particularly
susceptible to divided infringement conduct. Thus, the solution is to provide patent owners with
assurance that there will be some level of protection while concurrently addressing the potential
social costs. This requires a two-pronged approach characterized by intent-limited rules.
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The first prong closes the “mastermind loophole” by abandoning the rigid “direction or
control” standard for a broader more flexible instrumentalities standard. The instrumentalities
standard allows the court to go beyond the rigid boundaries of the agency relationship or other
contractual obligation. Under this approach an actor that uses another as an instrumentality to
complete the elements of a claim may be found liable. This provides flexibility to address everarising scenarios of divided infringement such as the common scenario of the mastermind
utilizing its natural relationship with its customers to complete the elements of a claim. Thus, the
instrumentalities approach would find liability under this scenario by incorporating the
fundamentals of the current infringement statutes by requiring the patent owner to show the
mastermind knew that the customer would perform the final elements or knew that the
completion of the final elements would be the natural result. Thus, the proper balance is struck
by ensuring that only those that seek to capture the patent’s value are liable.
The second prong closes the “conspiratory loophole” by first recognizing that claimdrafting techniques are a useful tool for this goal but not nearly sufficient. Once again the proper
balance of incentive and cost is struck by providing limiting principles that ensure liability will
be imposed only on those that misappropriate the patent’s value. Thus, multiple actors that
conspire to divide the performance of a patented claim would be met with a patent law form of
civil conspiracy that requires a showing of purpose or knowledge that such combined action
would result in the performance of another’s invention. This provides a remedy for the patent
owner, which signals potential inventors their inventive activity has protection, thereby
incentivizing creation. Further, authorized and public domain activities will not be restrained to
the detriment of society because only those that act with the purpose or knowledge of seizing the
patent’s value will be stopped.
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